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Introduction 
Restatements of financial reporting arise from many sources including changes in accounting rules, changes in reporting 
entity, accounting errors, and fraud (or “irregularities”).1 Theory predicts that audit effort (measured by audit fees) and 
financial report restatements should be negatively associated because more audit effort means that auditors should be more 
likely to find errors or other issues that could lead to later restatement (Shibano 1990; Matsumura and Tucker, 1992; Lobo 
and Zhao, 2013). However, other studies have found either a positive association or no association between audit fees and 
subsequent restatements (Kinney et al., 2004; Stanley and DeZoort, 2007; Cao et al., 2012; Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson, 
2014). There is an ongoing inconsistency between the theory and empirical findings in this area (Lobo and Zhao, 2013).   
In this study, we investigate the relationship between audit fees and two specific types of restatements: those caused by 
either fraud or errors. Whereas errors are unintentional misapplications of GAAP, or mistakes in data analysis, fraud is 
intentional and deliberate misreporting. Prior research provides evidence that investors differentiate between errors and 
irregularities (e.g., Palmrose, et al., 2004) and market reaction is greater to irregularities than to errors.  
In prior audit fee studies, auditors’ effort is often estimated by audit fees (Hribar et al., 2014; Lobo and Zhao, 2013). Low-
fee audits may represent a lower level of auditor effort, which can likely lead to a higher probability of restatements. Auditors 
also face far more severe penalties, such as litigation and a negative effect on their reputation, after fraud restatements than 
after error restatements. As such, auditors face very different situations when auditing firms that eventually end up requiring 
a restatement due to irregularities, versus those in which honest mistakes were made. In the case of potential irregularities, 
auditors are more likely to discover weaknesses in internal controls or overly aggressive accounting choices and will 
accordingly increase their audit testing, leading to higher audit fees (Hennes et al., 2008). In error restatement scenarios, 
such errors were unintentional and because the original financial statements received a clean audit opinion, it seems less 
likely that the auditing firm will detect situations that will require additional testing. 
Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson (2014) find that unexplained audit fees (UAF) are a valid measure for accounting quality (AQ) 
and as a predictor of restatements due to fraud.2 As accounting quality decreases, both UAF and the probability of fraud 
restatements increase. Based on Hribar et al. (2014), we expect that UAF will be significantly higher for firms that make 
restatements due to fraudulent reporting than firms that do not make restatements. These higher costs are the result of 
auditors having to exert additional efforts to assess weak internal controls and are also compensation for increased exposure 
to legal liability. Consistent with Hribar et al. (2014), our results provide strong evidence that fraud-related restatement 
firms pay significantly higher audit fees during the reporting period being restated than non-fraud firms. 
Hribar et al. (2014) did not include restatements due to errors in their study. In contrast to our fraud restatement expectation, 
we expect that UAF for firms restating their financial statements due to unintentional accounting errors will be significantly 
                                                 
1 In this study, “fraud” is used interchangeably with “(intentional) irregularity” or “deliberate misreporting,” while “(clerical) errors” is 
used interchangeably with “mistakes in data analyses.” 
2 Accounting quality is defined as qualitative characteristics of financial information or quality of financial statements (Barth et al., 
2008; Hribar et al., 2014). 
Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting 
Volume 10: Issue 3, July–December 2018 
 
333 
lower than those for non-restatement firms. The rationale for this expectation is twofold.  First, audit fees have increased 
significantly in the years following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 due to increased scrutiny of internal controls (Ghosh 
and Pawlewicz, 2009; Chasan, 2015). As a result, firms are more likely to shop around for affordable audit fees. Those who 
have successfully negotiated lower audit fees may be more likely to receive lower quality audits that fail to find and correct 
accounting errors that will be subsequently restated. Second, previous studies suggest that audit fees and financial report 
restatements are negatively associated (Shibano, 1990; Matsumura and Tucker, 1992; Lobo and Zhao, 2013). The theory is 
that higher audit effort increases the likelihood that auditors will detect errors and thus reduces the likelihood of restatements 
due to errors.  
However, our results show that audit fees for firms restating due to accounting errors are significantly higher during the 
reporting period than audit fees for firms without restatements. One explanation for these results is that auditors assess a 
greater inherent risk of misstatement due to both errors and frauds. As a result, they increase substantive testing to minimize 
detection risk, and therefore charge higher fees, even for error restatement firms.  
We provide additional analysis on the relationship between total fees, which include audit fees and non-audit service fees, 
and restatements due to fraud and clerical errors. The results are consistent with those for audit fees only. We also analyze 
the relationship between non-audit fees only and restatements due to fraud and clerical errors. The results indicate that 
neither of the associations is significant. Further, additional analyses using only post-SOX period data provide consistent 
results, although the positive association between audit fees and fraud is not statistically significant during the post-SOX 
(2003 to 2013) period. However, the positive association between audit fees and errors is consistently statistically 
significant. Finally, the results hold consistent, even after controlling for internal control quality. 
This study contributes to the literature relating to audit fees as a measure of accounting quality and predictor of restatement 
of financial reports. Prior research suggests that unexplained audit fees are a predictor of restatements due to fraud. We find 
that unexplained audit fees can also be used as a predictor of restatements due to accounting errors, even in the post-SOX 
era and after controlling for previously identified predictors and internal control quality.  
Prior Research and Hypotheses 
Audit Fees 
Theory predicts that audit effort (measured by audit fees) and financial report restatements should be negatively associated 
because more audit effort means that auditors should be more likely to find errors or other issues that could lead to later 
restatement (Shibano, 1990; Matsumura and Tucker, 1992; Lobo and Zhao, 2013). However, many studies have found either 
a positive association or no association between audit fees and subsequent restatements (Kinney et al., 2004; Stanley and 
DeZoort, 2007; Cao et al., 2012, Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson, 2014). Lobo and Zhao (2013) respond to this inconsistency 
by correcting for two factors that have biased the results. After controlling for pre-audit misstatement risk using Dechow et 
al.’s (2011) predicted probability of misstatement, and excluding unaudited reports (i.e., interim quarterly reports), they find 
a negative association between audit effort (i.e., audit fees) and annual report restatements. Internal control is expected to 
be significantly associated with audit fees because the audit process should be adjusted according to the auditors’ assessment 
of the client firm’s internal control environment. Hogan and Wilkins (2008) investigate the relationship between audit fees 
and internal control deficiencies to determine whether audit firms exert more effort during their audits of client firms with 
internal control deficiencies. They find that, on average, a thirty-five percent increment in audit fees when there are 
disclosures of internal control deficiencies. The lack of strong internal controls is a potential factor leading to financial 
reporting restatements. Both non-intentional clerical accounting errors and intentional fraud are more likely to occur in 
environments with weak internal controls. 
Irregularities vs. Errors 
Financial reporting restatements can be classified as being either accounting errors (unintentional misapplications of GAAP) 
or irregularities (intentional misreporting). Hennes et al. (2008) point out the importance of distinguishing errors from 
irregularities in restatement research. They define accounting irregularities as occurring when independent investigations 
are undertaken by “the SEC, the Attorney General’s Office, or by the company’s Board.” Based on this indicator of 
irregularities, they find that restatements result more from non-intentional errors than from intentional irregularities. 
However, the consequences of fraud are much higher than those for errors. Their results show that CEO/CFO turnover rates 
are higher for firms that report restatements because of intentional irregularities. Market reaction to restatements due to 
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irregularities was minus fourteen percent versus minus two percent for errors. And almost all cases of post-restatement 
replacement of the CEO/CFO occurred after restatements due to fraud. 
Auditors may face very different situations when auditing a firm that will eventually report a restatement due to 
irregularities, versus one where honest mistakes were made. For example, in 2003, a Big Four auditing firm (Ernst and 
Young) was completing an audit of LeNature, Inc., a large beverage producer located in LaTrobe, Pennsylvania, USA. The 
audit partner in charge asked the CFO if he was aware of, or suspected, any fraudulent activity within the organization. The 
CFO replied candidly that he doubted the reported sales revenue. The CEO, Gregory Podlucky, would not provide key 
documents to support the recorded sales figures. After considering this information and additional testing of the company’s 
internal control system and documentation, the accounting firm reported its findings to the Board, which appointed an 
outside law firm to investigate. Ultimately, it was discovered that Podlucky had been engaging in a massive “Ponzi scheme” 
fraud over a five-year period that totaled over $700 million. Several internal control weaknesses were discovered, including 
a serious lack of segregation of duties. The CEO had been maintaining two sets of books and had total control over detailed 
financial records. As an example, for one year, reported sales were $287 million, whereas actual sales were less than forty 
million dollars. Ultimately, Podlucky was sentenced to twenty years in prison and fined $661 million. Several other 
executives and family members also were convicted and sentenced to jail.3  
Hennes et al. (2008) cite examples of accounting restatements due to errors. In 2005, the CECO Environmental Corporation 
restated its financial statements because management detected an error in spreadsheets aggregating small project balances 
that the company used to recognize revenue. Another example is Applebee’s International, which restated its financial 
statements to correct its accounting treatment for leases, after the SEC clarified its position on the treatment of certain lease 
features. Many other companies in the restaurant and retail industries also corrected their accounting treatment for leases. 
In both cases, there was no evidence that the restatement was due to overly aggressive accounting choices, neither to 
deliberate misreporting. Possibly, the audit firms in these engagements detected the possibility of these errors, and 
accordingly increased their risk assessments and testing. However, because the errors were unintentional and the original 
financial statements received a clean audit opinion, it is also possible that the audit firms did not detect any issues that 
required additional testing.  
Financial reporting fraud is an extreme case of earnings management. Caramanis and Lennox (2008) investigate the 
relationship between audit effort and earnings management (income-increasing and income-decreasing). They conduct 
research based on a sample of 9,738 audits in Greece, from 1992–2002. They find that the audit effort is negatively 
correlated to the reporting of aggressively high earnings, based on an abnormal accruals measure. In other words, lower 
audit efforts are likely to allow managers to overstate company earnings more aggressively to meet or beat a firm’s internal, 
or external, reporting goals, such as analysts’ forecasts.  
As a similar line of research, Hribar et al. (2014) use audit fees to measure accounting reporting quality. They argue that 
audit fees charged by the auditor provide, to some extent, a measure of the auditor’s evaluation of accounting quality. 
Therefore, the unexplained audit fees can capture accounting quality. Their results show that unexplained audit fees are 
negatively related to quality accounting practices. They further provide evidence that this audit fee-based measure of 
accounting quality is associated with other empirical measures of accounting quality and predicts fraud and restatements, 
even after controlling for other accounting quality measures. 
In 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures.4 
Blankley, Hurtt, and MacGregor (2012) use a logit model to investigate the association between audit fees and the likelihood 
of subsequent restatements in general, using a sample of post-SOX data. They find a negative relationship between audit 
fees charged during the years prior to the filing of restatements and subsequent restatements. Their results validate a 
reasonable prediction that, on average, as audit firms charge higher audit fees which are likely to be related to increased 
                                                 
3 See Mark Kirschner v. K&L Gates LLP, et al., Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 46 a.3d 737 (2012), 2012 PA Super 102, July 19, 
2012. Retrieved from www.leagle.com/decision/In%20PACO%2020120514405 on Feb. 20, 2015. Also, CNS News, “Ex-Pa. Soft-
drink CEO Gets 20 Years in Prison,” October 23, 2011. Retrieved from http://cnsnews.com/ex-pa-soft-drink-ceo-gets-20-years-prison 
on Feb. 20, 2015. 
4 The Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America (U.S. Congress) (2002), “Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,” 
Public Law 107-204, 107th Congress. 
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audit work performed, the likelihood of future restatements (in general) are thus reduced (Lobo and Zhao, 2013). Both 
papers used restatements in general and did not segment them by reason for restatement.  
Hypotheses 
For each engagement, auditors are required by Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Auditing Standard 
No. 8 to assess the inherent risk (misstatement due to error or fraud), control risk (misstatement that could not be prevented 
or detected by the company’s internal controls), and detection risk (misstatement that could not be detected by the 
substantive procedures performed) and plan their work accordingly. The higher the inherent and control risks, the more 
testing auditors will have to do, more experienced staff will have to be assigned, and higher fees will be charged as a 
premium for the higher audit risk (Hribar et al., 2014; Bell, Landsman, and Shackleford ,2001). Hogan and Wilkins (2008) 
find evidence that additional audit fees are paid when internal control deficiencies are disclosed, which suggests that 
restatement firms are likely to pay additional audit fees. Further, a lack of strong internal controls increases the possible 
causes for financial reporting restatements.   
Moreover, when a client firm is found to have intentionally manipulated earnings, it is detrimental to the auditors’ reputation 
and leads to potential auditor litigation (Heninger, 2001; Palmrose, 1988). Prior research (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1993; and Kinney and Martin, 1994) has found that auditors tend to disagree more with clients 
about accounting choices that increase reported earnings. As a result, auditors will increase audit tests and efforts when they 
suspect income-increasing earnings management, likely leading to increased audit fees. Because income-increasing earnings 
manipulation is a form of intentional accounting fraud, we expect a positive relationship between audit fees and subsequent 
restatements due to fraud.  
Further, Hribar et al. (2014) find that unexplained higher audit fees charged are associated with client firm’s lower 
accounting quality and are predictive of subsequent restatements due to fraud. Their finding is also consistent with previous 
auditing research, which suggests that audit fees are positively correlated with lower accounting quality, as measured by 
discretionary accruals and poor internal controls (e.g., Gul et al., 2003; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008).  
In summary, a lack of strong internal controls, auditors’ concern about income-increasing earnings manipulation, and lower 
accounting quality can all lead to higher audit fees and make it more likely that subsequent restatements due to fraud will 
occur. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between audit fees and subsequent restatements due to fraud.  
Hypothesis 1: Firms who make accounting restatements due to financial reporting fraud pay higher audit fees during 
the reporting period restated than non-restatement firms. 
This study also investigates whether UAF are associated with restatements due to errors. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(hereafter SOX) (2002), audit fees increased sharply, due to the additional audit requirements related to the assessment of 
internal controls and auditors expected legal liability (Ghosh and Pawlewicz, 2009). Total audit fees increased 103% for the 
S&P 500 companies between 2001 and 2004 (Ciesielski and Weirich, 2009). According to a recent study, nearly three out 
of four organizations have spent considerably more to strengthen their internal controls in 2015 as auditors seek to provide 
better evidence the internal controls are working (Chasan, 2015). Hence, firms have more motivation to shop around for the 
most affordable auditor.  
Hribar et al. (2014) did not include restatements due to errors in their study. In contrast to our fraud restatement expectation, 
we expect that UAF for firms restating their financial statements due to unintentional accounting errors will be significantly 
lower than those for non-restatement firms. First, audit fees have increased significantly in the years following the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 due to increased scrutiny of internal controls (Ghosh and Pawlewicz, 2009; Chasan, 2015). As a result, 
firms are more likely to shop around for affordable audit fees which could lead to lower quality audits. Second, previous 
studies suggest that higher audit fees lead to higher quality audits that make it more likely auditors will detect errors and 
thus decrease the likelihood of restatements due to errors. 
Of course, there are risks associated with low-cost audits. The quality of audits being undertaken is likely to be prejudiced 
by resource constraints and could provide more opportunity for unethical practices. A failure by auditors to detect and 
prevent all material fraud and subsequent restatements will lead to negative market reactions and litigation against auditors. 
Because the consequences are far more severe for fraud restatements than those for error restatements, auditors have more 
motivation to increase their substantive testing for fraud than for errors.  
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We expect that audit fees for firms restating due to unintentional accounting errors will be significantly lower than audit 
fees for non-error firms. Firms that have successfully negotiated lower audit fees are more likely to receive lower quality 
audits that fail to find and correct accounting errors that must be subsequently restated. Auditors are less likely to add 
additional tests as fraud indicators (e.g., income increasing earnings management practices) are less likely to exist. 
Therefore, when audit fees are set low, auditors are not as likely to exert sufficient effort and audit tests to detect financial 
reporting errors. The low unexplained audit fees become an indicator of lower quality accounting and a decreased chance 
of auditors catching clerical accounting errors during their audits.  
Further, we expect that restatements due to errors will follow the traditional theory that higher audit effort increases the 
likelihood that auditors will detect errors, thus decreasing the likelihood of restatements due to errors.  Previous studies 
suggest that audit fees and financial report restatements are in general are negatively associated (Shibano, 1990; Matsumura 
and Tucker, 1992; Lobo and Zhao, 2013). As accounting errors are supposed to be unintentional, more “eyes” on the 
reporting should lead to fewer errors in the final financial reports. For these reasons, we propose our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms who make accounting restatements due to clerical financial reporting errors pay lower audit fees 
during the reporting period restated than non-restatement firms. 
Sample and Research Design 
Sample 
We construct samples of non-restatement firms and restatement firms using Audit Analytics and Compustat databases for 
the period of 1999 through to 2013. Specifically, audit fee data and non-reliance (fraud and clerical error) data are obtained 
from Audit Analytics. The Audit Analytics Non-Reliance database contains detailed information about firms’ restatements 
that were reported due to fraud or clerical errors.5 This database also includes the data about the duration of restatement 
periods. Next Audit Analytics and Compustat databases were linked to obtain accounting information for these restatement 
and non-restatement firms. When linking Audit Analytics non-reliance data to Compustat, the data is screened so that the 
filing dates of reporting non-reliance (fraud or error) information to the SEC happen after the fiscal year-end dates of 
restatement periods.  
Using this sample, we examine the association between audit fees and restatements due to clerical errors and fraud while 
controlling for other factors that may affect audit fees. Panel A in Table 1 presents the sample description in terms of 
restatements by group and year. The number of clerical error firm-year observations is 297, whilst the number of fraud firm-
year observations is 241. The total number of firm year observations is 50,003, which includes both non-restatement and 
restatement firm-years during the 1999 to 2013 period. Panel B in Table 1 shows the distribution of restatements due to 
fraud or clerical errors across industries. Following prior restatement studies (Blankley et al., 2012), we exclude firms in 
the financial service industry (SIC 6000-6999) in our sample. [see Table 1, pg 347] 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for different groups’ audit fees, measured as the natural logarithm of audit fees. The 
results show that the audit fees paid by firms that make restatements due to fraud tend to be higher than those of non-fraud 
and non-clerical error restatement firms. The mean natural log value of audit fees for fraud firms is 13.361, which is higher 
than the mean for non-fraud and non-clerical error firms of 12.973 (see Table 2, Panel A). The mean difference of 0.388 is 
statistically significant at the one percent level, using a two-sided t-test (p < 0.01; see Table 2, Panel B). Furthermore, the 
median difference of 0.420 is statistically significant at the one percent level, using a Wilcoxon z-test.  
In addition, firms that make restatements due to clerical accounting errors pay higher audit fees (mean 13.314) than firms 
that do not make fraud or error restatements (mean 12.973). As shown in Table 2, Panel B, the mean (median) difference of 
0.341 (0.551) is statistically significant at the one percent level using a two-sided t-test (Wilcoxon z-test). [see Table 2, pg 
348] 
                                                 
5 In Audit Analytics Non-Reliance Restatements database, we used the variable “restatement-fraud (#32)” to obtain our sample 
restatement firms due to frauds. To obtain sample restatement firms due to clerical errors, we used the variable “restatement-clerical 
error (#25).”  
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Audit Fee Model 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we run a regression model using the entire non-restatement and restatement (due to fraud and 
clerical errors) sample. The dependent variable of the model is the natural logarithm of audit fees, and the independent 
variables include two indicator (dichotomous) variables: FRAUD (equals one if the firm’s restatement involves fraud, 
otherwise zero) and ERROR (equals one if the firm’s restatement involves unintentional errors, otherwise zero). As 
discussed in the hypotheses section, we predict the sign of the coefficient of FRAUD variable will be positive and the sign 
of the coefficient of ERROR variable will be negative. To test for the effect of fraud or errors on audit fees (Hypotheses 1 
and 2), the following audit fee model is estimated: 
             lnAUDITFEE = β0 + β1FRAUD + β2ERROR + β3lnSIZE + β4lnSEGMENT  
                                   + β5FOREIGN + β6INHERENT + β7QUICKRATIO + β8DEBT + β9ROA 
                       + β10LOSS + β11OPINION+ β12BIG4 + β13TENURE + ɛ                  (A) 
where,            
lnAUDITFEE = the natural logarithm of the audit fee 
FRAUD = an indicator variable which is equal to one, if a firm belongs to the fraud 
restatement sample, or is zero otherwise 
ERROR = an indicator variable which is equal to one if a firm belongs to the clerical error 
restatement sample or zero otherwise 
lnSIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets 
lnSEGMENT = the natural logarithm of the number of business segments 
FOREIGN = an indicator variable which is equal to one if a firm has foreign currency 
translation adjustments. This variable indicates firms with international 
operations 
INHERENT = inventory and receivables divided by total assets 
QUICKRATIO = the ratio of current assets minus inventories to current liabilities 
DEBT = long-term debt divided by total assets 
ROA = income before extraordinary items, divided by lagged total assets 
LOSS = is equal to one, if a firm reports net losses 
OPINION = is equal to one, if a firm has nonstandard audit reports 
BIG4 = is equal to one, if a firm uses Big 4/5/6/8 auditors 
TENURE = is equal to one, if a firm has an auditor tenure of two or less years 
Model (A) includes several control variables that previous studies have found to be associated with audit fees. These control 
variables are related to either client attributes (client size, client complexity, etc.), or auditor attributes (Big Four, auditor 
tenure, etc.). Previous research found that client size is the most dominant determinant of audit fees (e.g., Simunic,1980; 
Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, and Raghunandan, 2003; Hay, Knechel, and Wong, 2006). Client SIZE is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets and is expected to be positively related with audit fees.  
Simunic (1980), Hackenbrack and Knechel (1997), and Hay et al. (2006) have found that the more complex the client's 
business, the higher the audit fees. The two most common proxies for client complexity are the number of business segments 
and the existence of foreign subsidiaries. SEGMENT is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of business 
segments and is predicted to have a positive relationship with audit fees. FOREIGN indicates whether or not a firm has 
international operations. FOREIGN is a dichotomous variable equal to one if a firm has foreign currency translation 
adjustments and has an expected positive association with audit fees. 
Previous research suggests that audit fees are positively associated with the level of inherent risk (e.g., Simunic, 1980; 
Newton and Ashton, 1989; Stice, 1991). Following previous studies, inherent risk (INHERENT) is measured as the sum of 
inventory and receivables, divided by total assets, and is expected to have a positive association with audit fees. In addition, 
previous studies (e.g., Simunic, 1980; Hay et al., 2006) have found that client’s leverage and profitability, which are 
measures of the risk of client failure, are significantly associated with audit fees. Consistent with previous research, 
QUICKRATIO is defined as the ratio of current assets minus inventories to current liabilities. DEBT measures the debt ratio 
and is computed by dividing long-term debt by total assets. Both the quick ratio and debt ratio are predicted to have negative 
relationships with audit fees. Client profitability is measured with the two most common measures suggested by previous 
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studies.  ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items, divided by lagged total assets. ROA is expected to have a 
negative association with audit fees. LOSS is an indicator (0,1) variable equal to one if a firm reports a net loss. The expected 
association between audit fees and LOSS is positive.  
The last three control variables in Model (A) are indicator (0,1) variables related to auditor attributes. OPINION is equal to 
one if a firm has a non-standard audit report. Audit quality is measured with the variable, BIG4, which is equal to one if a 
client firm uses Big Four auditors. Previous studies strongly support a positive association between Big Four auditors and 
audit fees.6 Lastly, TENURE is equal to one if a client has an auditor tenure of two or less years. Because a client may 
change its auditor to obtain a reduced audit fee from a new audit firm, the predicted associated between audit fees and 
TENURE is negative.   
Results 
Univariate Results 
In Table 3, the firm-specific characteristics of Fraud restatement and Error restatement sample firms are reported using 
univariate comparisons. As shown, fraud restatement firms are significantly larger than non-fraud and non-clerical-error 
firms. Additionally, the size of clerical-error firms is significantly larger than that of non-fraud and non-clerical-error firms. 
[see Table 3, pg 349] 
Regarding the client’s business complexity, the comparison results indicate that both fraud and error restatement firms have 
a significantly greater number of business segments (lnSEGMENT) than non-fraud & non-clerical-error firms. These results 
provide evidence that firm size and complexity are likely to be associated with fraud and clerical-error restatements. 
However, there is no statistically significant difference for the FOREIGN variable between groups. The results also indicate 
that fraud (clerical-error) restatement firms have a significantly higher inherent risk than non-fraud and non-clerical-error 
firms.  
For the client’s leverage and profitability, the results show that fraud and clerical-error restatement firms have significantly 
lower quick ratios than non-fraud and non-clerical-error firms. Although there is no statistically significant difference in 
means for DEBT between groups, the median DEBT for fraud restatement firms is significantly higher than the median 
DEBT of non-fraud and non-clerical-error firms. Regarding firm profitability, neither the mean nor median ROA for fraud 
or clerical-error restatement firms are significantly different from that of the mean ROA of non-fraud and non-clerical-error 
firms. The results also show that LOSS is not statistically significantly different between groups.  
Comparisons of the three indicator variables related to auditor attributes show that both fraud and clerical-error restatement 
firms have significantly more audit problems (OPINION) than non-fraud and non-clerical error firms. They are also more 
likely have been audited more frequently by BIG4 auditors than non-fraud and non-clerical error firms. However, TENURE 
is not statistically significantly different between groups. In sum, these univariate comparison results suggest that significant 
differences exist between fraud and error restatement firms and non-restatement firms in various audit-firm and client 
characteristics. 
Panel A, shown in Table 4, presents the results of the Pearson and Spearman correlation analyses between our key variables 
of interest. As hypothesized, FRAUD has a statistically significant positive relation to audit fees (lnAUDITFEE) (p < 0.0001, 
two-sided t-test). Unlike our prediction, however, ERROR has also a positive correlation to lnAUDITFEE. FRAUD also has 
a significant correlation with total fees (lnTOTALFEE) and non-audit service fees (lnNONAUDITFEE). In contrast, clerical 
errors (ERROR) are significantly correlated with audit fees and total fees but are not statistically significantly correlated 
with non-audit service fees. [see Table 4, pg 350] 
In Panel B of Table 4, the Pearson correlations (presented at the upper-right) report that the audit fee variable, lnAUDITFEE, 
is significantly and positively related to lnSIZE, lnSEGMENT, DEBT, ROA, OPINION, and BIG4. In contrast, audit fee is 
significantly and negatively related to INHERENT, QUICKRATIO, LOSS, and TENURE. The Spearman correlations 
(presented at the lower-left) report consistent results with the Pearson correlations, except that the significant negative 
correlation between lnAUDITFEE and INHERENT does not exist. Taken together, the Table 4 results are consistent with 
the argument that restatements due to fraud and errors, in addition to other factors, are significantly associated with the level 
                                                 
6 Such studies include Simunic (1980), DeFond et al. (2000), Whisenant et al. (2003), Chaney et al. (2004), and Lawrence, Minutti-
Meza, and Zhang (2011). For an extensive review of this literature, see Hay et al. (2006). 
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of audit fees. Therefore, to investigate the true relationship between audit fee and restatements due to fraud and errors, we 
must control for variation in these other confounding auditor and client characteristics. 
Multivariate Results 
Table 5 presents the primary multivariate results, using the regression Model (A) to test the association between audit fees 
and restatements due to fraud and errors as predicted in H1 and H2. We report four model specifications in Table 5. Model 
(1) is a base model specification, with only Fraud plus fiscal year and industry controls variables. The coefficient for 
FRAUD is positive at 0.5783, which means that higher audit fees are charged during the restatement periods when audit 
client firms commit financial statement fraud. The t-statistic of 7.23 indicates that this estimated coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level (two-sided t-test), and the adjusted-R2 is 0.189. [see Table 5, pg 352] 
Model (2) in Table 5 is another base model, with only ERROR plus fiscal year and industry indicator variables as controls. 
Contrary to our prediction in H2, the results report that the coefficient for ERROR is also positive (0.3589) and statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level (two-sided t-test) and the adjusted-R2 of Model (2) is 0.1886. This positive coefficient on ERROR 
means that higher audit fees are also charged during restatement periods caused by clerical errors. Model (3) includes both 
FRAUD and ERROR variables in the regressions, together with year and industry indicator variables as controls. The signs 
on the two variables of our interest, FRAUD and ERROR, are unchanged and remain significantly positive.  
Model (4) is the full model including the two variables of interest, FRAUD and ERROR, plus all other control variables. 
The overall Adjusted-R2 of Model (4) increases to 0.8264, which indicates that the model explains almost eighty-three 
percent of the variation in audit fees. Except for FOREIGN, the coefficients of all control variables in Model (4) have the 
expected signs and are statistically significant. Also, the coefficient BIG4 is 0.3881 (t-value = 53.15) and the coefficient 
TENURE is -0.0189 (t-value = -2.01). These results suggest that audit fees are positively associated with audit quality and 
that a client is likely to change its auditor to obtain a reduced audit fee from a new audit firm (i.e., evidence of audit fee 
‘low-balling’).  
FRAUD has a positive coefficient of 0.0963, which is lower than the base models but still statistically significant at the one 
percent level (t-value of 2.60), supporting H1. This result indicates that firms that restate their financial statements due to 
accounting fraud are more likely to have paid higher audit fees during the reporting period being restated than non-
restatement firms. 
The ERROR variable is found to have a positive coefficient of 0.1503 (p < 0.01), thus failing to support H2. Hypothesis 2 
predicts that when audit fees are low, auditors less likely to exert sufficient efforts to detect clerical financial reporting errors 
during their audits. However, the results in Table 5 indicate that firms that make restatements due to clerical accounting 
errors have paid higher audit fees during restatement periods. Perhaps auditors charge higher audit fees because these clients 
also exhibit a weak internal control environment during the restatement periods. This possibility is addressed later. 
Restatements and Total Fees 
We conducted additional analyses to investigate the association between total fees and fraud and clerical errors. Total fees 
include audit fees and non-audit service fees, such as fees for consulting services offered to the client firm. Non-audit service 
fees have garnered the recent attention of researchers (e.g., Feldmann and Read, 2010), as well as that of legislators (U.S. 
Senate, 2002), as the receipt of non-audit service fees may create the economic bond between the auditor and the client and 
weaken auditor independence. However, several critics have argued that what matters most are the total fees that an audit 
firm receives from its client, including both audit and non-audit fees (Blay and Geiger, 2013; Kinney and Libby, 2002; SEC, 
2000a and 2000b). 
Research of non-audit fees has shown mixed results in explaining audit fees. Several previous studies (e.g., Bell, Landsman, 
and Shackelford, 2001; Davis, Ricchiute, and Trompeter, 1993; and Simunic, 1984) provide evidence that a significant 
association exists between audit and non-audit fees, which suggests that non-audit fees influence audit fees, and vice versa. 
On the other hand, Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, and Raghunandan (2003) and Dhaliwal, Gleason, Heitzman, and 
Melendrez (2008) find no association between audit and non-audit fees. 
The results using total fees are presented in Table 6. We report two model specifications with total fees (lnTOTALFEE) and 
non-audit fees (lnNON-AUDITFEE) (e.g., consulting fees) as the dependent variables. Model (1) incorporates all other 
control variables with the two variables that interest us, FRAUD and ERROR, with lnTOTALFEE as the dependent variable.  
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As shown, the results are consistent with the findings reported for Model (4) in Table 5, indicating that firms that restate 
their financial statements due to both fraud and clerical errors have paid higher total fees (audit plus non-audit service fees) 
during restatement periods. [see Table 6, pg 353] 
In Table 6, Model (2) has the same independent variables as Model (1) but the dependent variable is lnNON-AUDITFEE to 
investigate the association between non-audit service fees and restatements due to fraud and clerical errors. Koh, Rajgopal, 
and Srinivasan (2013), using non-audit service fee data from 1978 to 1980, find evidence that non-audit services provided 
by audit firms are related to improved earnings and audit quality, resulting from the spillover effect of enhanced knowledge 
gained by delivering both audit and non-audit services. The results of Model (2) presented in Table 6 indicate the signs on 
FRAUD and ERROR are positive but not statistically significant.  
Overall, the results reported in Table 6 of a significantly positive relationship between combined audit and non-audit fees 
and subsequent restatements, taken together with the non-significant relationship between non-audit fees and restatements, 
indicate that the enhanced knowledge spillover effect of increased non-audit fees (such as consulting fees) do not prevent 
subsequent financial restatements.  
Impact of Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act 
The Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002 has significantly altered the audit process, which potentially affects audit fees. In 
Table 7, results are reported using the regression Model (A) for only the post-SOX period. The number of firm-years used 
for the analyses reduced from 50,003 observations for full sample years (1999–2013) to 38,044 for the post-SOX sample 
years (2003–2013).  The adjusted-R2 of Model (1) of 0.8315 indicates that the model still explains over eighty-three percent 
of audit fees even when only using the sample data from the post-SOX period. However, the coefficient of FRAUD, 0.0747, 
is positive but smaller than the coefficient obtained using full sample years as reported in Table 5 (0.0963, t-value = 2.60). 
Moreover, this positive coefficient of FRAUD is only marginally statistically significant (t-value = 1.59; one-sided p-value 
= 0.0554) but is nevertheless still consistent with H1. [see Table 7, pg 354] 
In contrast, the coefficient of ERROR is 0.1542, which is significantly positive (t-value = 4.03; two-sided p-value < 0.01). 
The magnitude of this coefficient is comparable to the size of the ERROR coefficient of 0.1503 (t-value = 4.51, and p < 
0.01) obtained using the full sample years reported in Table 5. In summary, these results are consistent with the main 
findings reported in Table 5 that audit fees are positively associated with restatements caused by both fraud and clerical 
errors. 
In Table 7, the results of the regression Models (2) and (3) are reported with total fees and non-audit service fees as the 
dependent variables, respectively, and using only post-SOX period data (2003–2013). In Model (2), the adjusted-R2 of the 
model with total fees as the dependent variable is 0.8375. FRAUD has a statistically significantly positive coefficient of 
0.1131 (t-value = 2.43, p < 0.05), which indicates that total fees (audit fees and non-audit fees) paid by firms during the 
restatement years are higher than those for non-restatement firms. Also, ERROR has a positive coefficient of 0.1209 and is 
significant at the one percent level (t-value = 3.18). These results are consistent with the findings for total fees as reported 
in Table 6 using the entire sample years (1999–2013), indicating that firms that restate their financial statements due to 
accounting fraud or clerical errors have paid higher total fees (the sum of audit and non-audit service fees) during the 
restatement periods. 
As reported in Table 7, Model (3), we find that non-audit service fees are not significantly related to FRAUD and ERROR, 
using only post-SOX data. These results are consistent with the findings reported in Table 6 using the entire sample for 
1999–2013. In summary, the results reported in Table 7 provide evidence that firms that restate their financial statements 
due to accounting fraud or clerical errors in the post-SOX era have paid higher audit fees and total fees during the restatement 
periods. 
Internal Control Environment 
The results in Tables 5, 6, and 7 indicate that firms that make restatements due to clerical accounting errors have paid higher 
audit fees during restatement periods. Perhaps auditors charge higher audit fees because these clients also exhibit a weak 
internal control environment during the restatement periods. To address this possibility, we conducted additional analysis 
that incorporates a “weak internal controls” (WEAKIC) variable in the model. As directed by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, companies are required to include a report of the company's internal control over financial reporting in 
their annual reports. WEAKIC is measured as an indicator (0,1) variable equal to one if the firm’s internal control report has 
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a qualified opinion. Table 8 presents the results of the additional analysis. In Models (1) and (2), the overall Adjusted-R2 is 
0.7706, which is slightly smaller, primarily because the “weak internal control (WEAKIC)” variable has only 20,773 
observations. The results reported in Table 8 for Models (1) and (2) strengthen our main findings of a positive relationship 
between audit fees with restatements due to fraud and error because it shows the results are robust to the inclusion of the 
variable capturing weak internal control environment. [see Table 8, pg 355] 
Unexplained FRAUD and Unexplained ERROR 
Lastly, in addition to using our main Model (A) to test H1 and H2, we develop an alternative two-stage model to test our 
two hypotheses. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 9. In the first stage of the two-stage model, we use a logit 
model with FRAUD and ERROR as the dependent variables, and all other control variables in Model (A) are incorporated 
as control variables in the model. We obtain the error terms from the first-stage logit model and use them as the two 
independent variables of interest, Unexplained FRAUD and Unexplained ERROR, in the second-stage OLS model. These 
two new variables are designed to capture the unexplained portion of FRAUD and ERROR by other control variables. [see 
Table 9, pg 356] 
The results in Table 9, Model (3) indicate that Unexplained FRAUD has a statistically significant positive coefficient of 
0.1392 (t-value = 2.28, p < 0.05) when the dependent variable is audit fees. Likewise, Unexplained ERROR has a positive 
coefficient of 0.0813, and is also statistically significant (t-value = 1.97, p < .05). These results are consistent with our main 
findings reported in Tables 5 and 6, which indicates that firms that restate their financial statements due to accounting fraud 
or clerical errors have paid higher audit fees and total fees during the restatement periods.  
Conclusion 
In this study, we find evidence that the relationship between audit fees and restatements of financial statements does not 
always follow theory. Specifically, we find that restatements due to errors (i.e., unintentional misapplications of GAAP or 
mistakes in data analysis) and those due to frauds (i.e., intentional and deliberate misreporting), both have higher ex ante 
unexplained audit fees during the restatement period than firms without fraud or error restatements.  Prior research findings 
have been inconsistent regarding the relationship between fees and restatements—some finding a positive relationship and 
some finding a negative relationship. This study is unique in that it focuses on restatements caused by fraud and by errors. 
It also considers auditors’ and managers’ behavior regarding the economic bonding of auditors with clients and managers’ 
attempts to lower audit fees.  
These fraud-related restatement results are consistent with our prediction that fraud-related restatement companies tend to 
pay significantly higher audit fees during the restatement periods. Lower accounting quality leads to higher unexplained 
audit fees and also increases the risk of fraud restatements. It is also consistent with the idea that firms with weak internal 
control environments will require additional audit steps and also increases the risk of fraud restatements. This finding is 
also consistent with Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson (2014) who find that unexplained audit fees (UAF) are a valid measure for 
accounting quality and as a predictor of restatements due to fraud.  
However, the unintentional error-related restatement results are not consistent with our prediction that error-related 
restatement companies tend to pay significantly lower audit fees during the restatement periods. Our findings indicate that 
higher audit fees are also charged to firms who make clerical errors during restatement years (when errors are produced). 
One potential explanation for this result is that auditors may also require additional audit steps for companies that have weak 
internal controls. However, in additional testing we found the results were robust even when including a variable 
representing a weak internal control environment.  
Today’s firms have increasing motivation to shop around for the most affordable auditor as total audit fees and internal 
controls costs continue to rise. Although client firms may shop around for the lowest audit fees to control costs, auditors 
may be so concerned about their reputation and potential audit litigation that they are unwilling to lower their audit quality 
standards to attract new clients. Therefore, this “shop around” strategy may only be financially beneficial for those firms 
with adequate internal controls in place, good accounting quality, and lower inherent risk of errors.  
The findings of our study seem to contradict the findings of Blankley, Hurtt, and MacGregor (2012), which found a negative 
relationship between audit fees charged during the years prior to the filing of restatements and the likelihood of subsequent 
restatements in general using post-SOX data set. Blankley et al. (2012) suggest that higher audit fees lead to more audit 
work performed, which reduces the likelihood of future restatements. That reasoning seems rational. But then why do we 
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find exactly the opposite? It is important to understand the different research designs between the two studies. First, we use 
a sample of firms that announced restatements caused only by managers’ intentional frauds or unintentional clerical errors, 
whereas Blankley et al. (2012) considered all restatements (e.g., those due to new accounting standard requirements, etc.). 
Second, they use only firms audited by Big N firms whereas we use an indicator variable to control for variation due to 
having a Big N auditor (which are known to charge higher fees). Third, Blankley et al. (2012) also exclude firms that 
changed auditors to “avoid the potential problems associated with lowballing to gain new clients and to eliminate the 
possibility of a differential response to reporting policies between the predecessor and the successor auditors.” We include 
these firms and use a variable “TENURE” to indicate auditor tenure of two years or less. Fourth, their sample period begins 
in the year SOX was passed in 2002 and extends through 2009. Our post-SOX sample period runs from 2003–2013.   
In the model that we use for further additional analyses, we control for weak internal control quality. Our results accordingly 
indicate that auditors charge higher audit fees in consideration of weak internal control when they perform audits during 
restatement years. However, charging higher audit fees does not prevent subsequent material restatements from occurring. 
This evidence provides a challenge for auditors to consider developing and pursuing specific audit tasks and skills to identify 
clients’ forensic accounting behavior leading to subsequent fraud and error findings. 
Our finding of a positive relationship between audit fees and subsequent fraud-related and error-related restatements, after 
controlling for internal control quality, is consistent with the results of both Blay and Geiger (2013) and Stanley and DeZoort 
(2007). Audit failure and subsequent restatement is likely to be the result of weakened auditor independence. In this setting, 
the economic bonding of auditors with clients reduces auditors’ independence to employ the adequate expert skepticism, 
which is needed to judge situations objectively, based on the correct interpretation of audit evidence.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
lnAUDITFEE = the natural logarithm of the audit fee; 
lnTOTALFEE = the natural logarithm of the total fee; 
lnNONAUDITFEE = the natural logarithm of the non-audit service fee; 
FRAUD = an indicator variable which is equal to one, if a firm belongs to the fraud 
restatement sample, or is zero otherwise; 
ERROR = an indicator variable which is equal to one if a firm belongs to the clerical 
error restatement sample or zero otherwise; 
lnSIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; 
lnSEGMENT = the natural logarithm of the number of business segments; 
FOREIGN = an indicator variable which is equal to one if a firm has foreign currency 
translation adjustments. This variable indicates firms with international 
operations; 
INHERENT = inventory and receivables divided by total assets; 
QUICKRATIO = the ratio of current assets minus inventories to current liabilities; 
DEBT = long-term debt divided by total assets; 
ROA = income before extraordinary items, divided by lagged total assets 
LOSS = is equal to one, if a firm reports net losses; 
OPINION = is equal to one, if a firm has nonstandard audit reports; 
BIG4 = is equal to one, if a firm uses Big 4/5/6/8 auditors; 
TENURE = is equal to one, if a firm has an auditor tenure of two or less years; 
         WEAKIC 
 
= is equal to one, if a firm has nonstandard report of internal control over 
financial reporting. 
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Table 1: Sample Description 
 
Panel A: Restatements by Group and by Year 
 
Year All Firms 
(Restatement and  
Non-Restatement) 
Fraud 
Restatement 
Firms  
 
Clerical Error 
Restatement 
Firms 
 
Fraud or 
Clerical Error 
Restatement 
Firms 
Non-Fraud  
and Non-
Clerical Error 
Firms  
 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) = (A) – (D) 
      
1999 15 0 0 0                  15  
2000 3,515 29 19 48            3,467  
2001 4,108 36 25 59            4,049  
2002 4,321 30 35 63            4,258  
2003 4,413 34 26 59            4,354  
2004 4,348 25 29 53            4,295  
2005 4,186 17 31 47            4,139  
2006 4,015 15 31 45            3,970  
2007 3,803 12 37 49            3,754  
2008 3,560 10 27 37            3,523  
2009 3,410 14 13 27            3,383  
2010 3,312 9 15 23            3,289  
2011 3,196 5 5 10            3,186  
2012 3,067 4 4 8            3,059  
2013 734 1 0 1                733  
Total 50,003 241 297 529          49,474  
 
 
Panel B: Restatements by Industry 
 
Industry All Firms 
(Restatement and  
Non-Restatement) 
Fraud 
Restatement 
Firms  
 
Clerical 
Error 
Restatement 
Firms 
 
Fraud or 
Clerical Error 
Restatement 
Firms 
Non-Fraud  
and Non-
Clerical Error 
Firms  
 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) = (A) – (D) 
 
Mining, Construction  2,774   16   23  39  2,735  
Manufacturing  23,932   90   146  233  23,699  
Transportation,       
   Communication, Utilities  5,236   21   24  45  5,191  
Wholesale, Retail  5,604   20   40  59  5,545  
Services  10,564   87   56  141  10,423  
Other  1,893   7   8  12  1,881  
   Total 50,003 241 297 529          49,474  
The total number of firm year observations in the sample is 50,003, which includes both non-restatement and 
restatement firm-years during the 1999 to 2013 period, obtained from Audit Analytics and Compustat databases. 
The restatement sample includes 297 clerical error and 241 fraud firm-year observations. Nine restatement 
observations include firm-years due to both fraud and clerical errors (241 + 297 – 9 = 529). 
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Table 2: Comparison of Audit Fee by Group 
 
Panel A: lnAUDITFEE by Group 
  
 All Firms 
(Restatement and  
Non-Restatement) 
Fraud 
Restatement 
Firms  
 
Clerical Error 
Restatement 
Firms 
 
Fraud or 
Clerical Error 
Restatement 
Firms  
Non-Fraud  
and Non-Clerical 
Error Firms  
 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) = (A) – (D) 
      
Frequency 50,003 241 297 529 49,474 
Mean 12.976 13.361 13.314 13.321 12.973 
Median 12.950 13.366 13.497 13.424 12.946 
Min 10.044 10.044 10.044 10.043 10.043 
Max 16.292 16.292 15.864 16.292 16.292 
 
 
Panel B: lnAUDITFEE Comparisons between Groups 
  
 Difference  
between Fraud Firms  
AND Non-Fraud  
and Non-Clerical Error Firms  
Difference  
between Clerical Error Firms  
AND Non-Fraud  
and Non-Clerical Error Firms  
Difference  
between Fraud or Clerical Error Firms 
AND Non-Fraud  
and Non-Clerical Error Firms  
 (B - E) (C - E) (D -  E) 
    
Frequency 241 vs. 49,474 297 vs. 49,474 529 vs. 49,474 
Mean 0.388*** 0.341*** 0.348*** 
Median 0.420*** 0.551*** 0.478*** 
Min 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Max 0.000 -0.428 0.000 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for different groups’ audit fees, measured as the natural logarithm of audit fees.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance 
at ten percent, five percent, and one percent, respectively using two-sided t-test for mean difference (or Wilcoxon nonparametric test for median difference). Nine 
restatement observations include firm-years due to both fraud and clerical errors (241 + 297 – 9 = 529). 
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Table 3: Comparison of Firm Characteristics by Group 
 
Variable Statistics All Firms 
 
Fraud  
Firms  
 
Clerical  
Error  
Firms 
Fraud or 
Clerical Error 
Firms  
Non-Fraud  
and Non-Clerical 
Error Firms  
Difference  
 
Difference  
 
Difference  
 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) = A – D (B - E) (C - E) (D - E) 
lnSIZE Mean 5.398 6.021 5.638 5.793 5.394 0.627*** 0.244* 0.399*** 
 Median 5.357 6.083 5.594 5.689 5.354 0.729*** 0.240** 0.335*** 
lnSEGMENT Mean 0.572 0.776 0.693 0.723 0.571 0.205*** 0.122*** 0.152*** 
 Median 0 1.099 0.693 0.693 0.000 1.099*** 0.693*** 0.693*** 
FOREIGN Mean 0.001 0 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
INHERENT Mean 0.244 0.308 0.272 0.289 0.243 0.065*** 0.029** 0.046*** 
 Median 0.204 0.297 0.263 0.278 0.203 0.094*** 0.060*** 0.075*** 
QUICKRATIO Mean 2.684 1.864 2.249 2.089 2.690 -0.826*** -0.441** -0.601*** 
 Median 1.516 1.416 1.377 1.392 1.518 -0.102*** -0.141** -0.126*** 
DEBT Mean 0.150 0.164 0.149 0.157 0.150 0.014 -0.001 0.007 
 Median 0.079 0.133 0.086 0.115 0.079 0.054** 0.007 0.036* 
ROA Mean -0.100 -0.073 -0.051 -0.063 -0.100 0.027 0.049* 0.037* 
 Median 0.025 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.025 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 
LOSS Mean 0.394 0.423 0.401 0.412 0.394 0.029 0.007 0.018 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OPINION Mean 0.381 0.515 0.556 0.535 0.379 0.136*** 0.177*** 0.156*** 
 Median 0 1 1 1 0 1*** 1*** 1*** 
BIG4 Mean 0.702 0.809 0.747 0.773 0.702 0.107*** 0.045* 0.071*** 
 Median 1 1 1 1 1 0*** 0* 0*** 
TENURE Mean 0.083 0.083 0.098 0.093 0.083 0 0.015 0.010 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Frequency  50,003 241 297 529 49,474 241 vs. 
49,474  
297 vs. 49,474 529 vs. 
49,474 
 
This table compares the firm characteristics for the following groups: (A) all firms, (B) firms with restatements due to fraud, (C) firms with restatements due to 
errors, (D) firms with restatements due to fraud or errors, and (E) firms without restatements due to fraud or errors. All variables are defined in Appendix. *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at ten percent, five percent, and one percent, respectively using two-sided t-test for mean difference (or Wilcoxon 
nonparametric test for median difference).  
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix for Variables 
 
Panel A: Correlation between Audit Fee and Fraud and Clerical Error (n = 50,003) 
 
Variables lnAUDITFEE lnTOTALFEE LnNONAUDITFEE FRAUD ERROR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1)  0.96496
*** 0.55877*** 0.05129*** 0.04881*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(2) 0.96183***  0.7089
*** 0.06033*** 0.03767*** 
 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0028 
(3) 0.56173*** 0.72229
***  0.06581*** -0.00151 
 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.9045 
(4) 0.04215*** 0.05063
*** 0.05959***  -0.01784 
 0.0008 <.0001 <.0001  0.157 
(5) 0.05403*** 0.04034
*** -0.00328 0.01784  
 <.0001 0.0014 0.7949 0.157  
 
 
Panel A of this table provides the Pearson and Spearman correlations between audit fees (lnAUDITFEE), total fees (lnTOTALFEE), non-audit fees 
(lnNONAUDITFEE), FRAUD, and ERROR. All variables are defined in Appendix. Pearson correlations are presented at the top-right half of the table; and the 
Spearman correlations are presented at the bottom-left half of the table.  *, **, *** indicate that variables are statistically significantly correlated at ten percent, 
five percent, and one percent, respectively.  
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel B: Correlation between Audit Fee and Control Variables (n = 50,003) 
 
Variables 
(1) 
lnAUDITFEE 
(2) 
lnSIZE 
(3) 
lnSEGMENT 
(4) 
INHERENT 
(5) 
QUICK 
RATIO 
(6) 
DEBT 
(7) 
ROA 
(8) 
FOREIGN 
(9) 
LOSS 
(10) 
OPINION 
(11) 
BIG4 
(12) 
TENURE 
(1)  0.8383*** 0.3509*** -0.0578*** -0.2294*** 0.2718*** 0.2522*** -0.0041 -0.2744*** 0.1799*** 0.5020*** -0.118*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.3560 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(2) 0.8295***  0.3562*** -0.1337*** -0.2168*** 0.3966*** 0.3357*** -0.0093 -0.3917*** 0.1261*** 0.5537*** -0.103*** 
 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0382 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(3) 0.3310*** 0.3480***  0.0751*** -0.1865*** 0.1758*** 0.1606*** -0.0044 -0.1843*** 0.0664*** 0.1503*** -0.023*** 
 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.3206 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(4) 0.0044 -0.0783*** 0.1343***  -0.2590*** -0.1503*** 0.1857*** -0.0050 -0.1443*** -0.0626*** -0.1134*** 0.040*** 
 0.3210 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2676 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(5) -0.1504*** -0.2216*** -0.1596*** -0.1677***  -0.2470*** -0.1385*** -0.0054 0.1538*** -0.0993*** -0.0709*** -0.008* 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.2265 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0804 
(6) 0.3243*** 0.4583*** 0.2313*** -0.0658*** -0.4014***  0.1075*** 0.0168*** -0.0875*** 0.0838*** 0.1878*** -0.021*** 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(7) 0.2441*** 0.3477*** 0.1474*** 0.2237*** -0.0178*** 0.0399***  -0.0053 -0.4974*** -0.0616*** 0.1640*** -0.026*** 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.2408 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(8) -0.0044 -0.0088 -0.0032 -0.0098** -0.0159*** 0.0058 -0.0150***  0.0189*** 0.0001 -0.0154*** 0.016*** 
 0.3250 0.0499 0.4749 0.0279 0.0004 0.1944 0.0008  <.0001 0.9915 0.0006 0.0003 
(9) -0.2765*** -0.3981*** -0.1833*** -0.1807*** 0.0947*** -0.1382*** -0.8463*** 0.0189***  0.0346*** -0.1705*** 0.053*** 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(10) 0.1804*** 0.1326*** 0.0652*** -0.0571*** -0.1350*** 0.0915*** -0.0615*** 0.0001 0.0346***  0.1029*** -0.006 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9915 <.0001  <.0001 0.187 
(11) 0.5069*** 0.5634*** 0.1485*** -0.0730*** -0.0138*** 0.2066*** 0.1373*** -0.0154*** -0.1705*** 0.1029***  -0.141*** 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0021 <.0001 <.0001 0.0006 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 
(12) -0.1229*** -0.1074*** -0.0215*** 0.0326*** -0.0152*** -0.0238*** -0.0522*** 0.0162*** 0.0525*** -0.0059 -0.1411***  
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0007 <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 <.0001 0.1870 <.0001  
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Table 5: The Association between Audit Fees and Fraud and Clerical Errors 
 
             lnAUDITFEE = β0 + β1FRAUD + β2ERROR + β3lnSIZE + β4lnSEGMENT  
                                   + β5FOREIGN + β6INHERENT + β7QUICKRATIO + β8DEBT + β9ROA 
                     + β10LOSS + β11OPINION+ β12BIG4 + β13TENURE + ɛ                             (A) 
 
Variables Predicted  
Sign 
Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
FRAUD + 0.5783***    0.5678***  0.0963*** 
(t value)  (7.23)    (7.10)  (2.60) 
ERROR -   0.3589***  0.3449***  0.1503*** 
    (4.98)  (4.79)  (4.51) 
lnSIZE +       0.4837*** 
        (262.66) 
lnSEGMENT +       0.1197*** 
        (28.93) 
FOREIGN +       0.1149 
        (1.48) 
INHERENT +       0.3271*** 
        (18.08) 
QUICKRATIO -       -0.0254*** 
        (-31.14) 
DEBT -       -0.2129*** 
        (-12.39) 
ROA -       -0.0429*** 
        (-6.69) 
LOSS +       0.1866*** 
        (28.80) 
OPINION +       0.1810*** 
        (31.29) 
BIG4 +       0.3881*** 
        (53.15) 
TENURE -       -0.0189*** 
        (-2.01) 
Constant 
 
10.9874*** 
 
10.9887*** 
 
10.9862*** 
 
9.2761*** 
  (187.27)  (187.24)  (187.28)  (311.96) 
Year Controlled  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Controlled  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample Size  50,003  50,003  50,003  50,003 
Adjusted R2  0.1890  0.1886  0.1894  0.8264 
       
This table provides regression results testing the association between audit fees and restatement due to fraud and 
errors as predicted in H1 and H2. Variables are defined in Appendix. The table reports four model specifications. 
Model (1) is the base model specification with only Fraud and fiscal year and industry indicator variables as 
controls. Model (2) is another base model with only ERROR variable and fiscal year and industry indicator variables 
as controls. Model (3) includes both FRAUD and ERROR variables in the regressions, together with year and 
industry indicator variables as controls. Model (4) is the full model including FRAUD and ERROR and all other 
control variables.   *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at ten percent, five percent, and one percent, 
respectively using two-sided t-test. 
Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting 
Volume 10: Issue 3, July–December 2018 
 
353 
Table 6: The Association between Total (and Non-Audit) Fees and Fraud and Clerical Errors 
              
 
 
Predicted  
Sign Model (1)  Model (2) 
Dependent Variable  lnTOTALFEE  lnNONAUDITFEE 
Independent Variables:     
FRAUD + 0.1061***  0.1348 
(t value)  (2.83)  (1.33) 
ERROR - 0.1315***  0.0001 
  (3.89)  (0.01) 
lnSIZE + 0.5262***  0.6258*** 
  (282.21)  (124.59) 
lnSEGMENT + 0.1209***  0.2084*** 
  (28.88)  (18.46) 
FOREIGN + 0.0591  -0.0945 
  (0.75)  (-0.45) 
INHERENT + 0.2999***  0.2689*** 
  (16.37)  (5.45) 
QUICKRATIO - -0.0231***  -0.0223*** 
  (-28.00)  (-10.03) 
DEBT - -0.2087***  -0.0123 
  (-11.99)  (-0.26) 
ROA - -0.0936***  -0.1853*** 
  (-14.40)  (-10.57) 
LOSS + 0.1790***  0.0738*** 
  (27.29)  (4.18) 
OPINION + 0.1291***  0.0289* 
  (22.04)  (1.83) 
BIG4 + 0.3747***  0.3618*** 
  (50.68)  (18.16) 
TENURE - -0.1071***  -0.6001*** 
  (-11.22)  (-23.33) 
Constant 
 
9.6387*** 
 
7.9575*** 
  (320.16)  (98.09) 
Year Controlled  Yes  Yes 
Industry Controlled  Yes  Yes 
Sample Size  50,003  50,003 
Adjusted R2  0.8266  0.4857 
 
This table provides regression results testing the association between total (and non-audit fees) and restatements due 
to fraud and errors. Variables are defined in Appendix. Model (1) is the full model (A) with the natural logarithm of 
total audit fees (lnTOTALFEE) as the dependent variable. Model (2) is the full model (A) with the natural logarithm 
of non-audit fees (lnNONAUDITFEE) as the dependent variable.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at ten 
percent, five percent, and one percent, respectively using two-sided t-test. 
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Table 7: Post-SOX1 period Analysis 
                      
 
 
Predicted 
Sign Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Dependent Variable  lnAUDITFEE  lnTOTALFEE  lnNON-AUDITFEE 
Independent Variables:       
FRAUD + 0.0747*  0.1131**  0.1183 
(t value)  (1.59)  (2.43)  (0.88) 
ERROR - 0.1542***  0.1209***  0.0257 
  (4.03)  (3.18)  (0.23) 
lnSIZE + 0.4998***  0.5141***  0.5822*** 
  (234.95)  (243.53)  (94.89) 
lnSEGMENT + 0.1157***  0.1226***  0.2421*** 
  (24.69)  (26.36)  (17.91) 
FOREIGN + 0.0074  -0.0269  0.0709 
  (0.09)  (-0.33)  (0.30) 
INHERENT + 0.3411***  0.3193***  0.3082*** 
  (16.55)  (15.61)  (5.19) 
QUICKRATIO - -0.0197***  -0.0201***  -0.0242*** 
  (-21.36)  (-21.84)  (-9.09) 
DEBT - -0.2760***  -0.2261***  0.0438 
  (-14.18)  (-11.70)  (0.78) 
ROA - -0.0501***  -0.0566***  -0.1030*** 
  (-6.81)  (-7.77)  (-4.86) 
LOSS + 0.2166***  0.1988***  0.0525** 
  (29.24)  (27.05)  (2.46) 
OPINION + 0.1324***  0.1296***  0.0973*** 
  (19.84)  (19.57)  (5.06) 
BIG4 + 0.4504***  0.4372***  0.3712*** 
  (55.14)  (53.93)  (15.76) 
TENURE - 0.0081  -0.0268**  -0.5136*** 
  (0.69)  (-2.30)  (-15.21) 
Constant 
 
9.2574*** 
 
9.5724*** 
 
7.8773*** 
  (266.02)  (277.18)  (78.49) 
Year Controlled  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Controlled  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample Size  38,044  38,044  38,044 
Adjusted R2  0.8315  0.8375  0.4490 
       
This table provides regression results testing the association between audit fees (also total and non-audit fees) and 
restatement due to fraud and errors using data from the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period (2003–2013). Variables are 
defined in Appendix. Model (1) is the full model (A) with the natural logarithm of audit fees (lnAUDITFEE) as the 
dependent variable. Model (2) is the full model (A) with the natural logarithm of total audit fees (lnTOTALFEE) as 
the dependent variable. Model (3) is the full model (A) with the natural logarithm of non-audit fees 
(lnNONAUDITFEE) as the dependent variable.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at ten percent, five 
percent, and one percent, respectively using two-sided t-test. 
1 The Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America (U.S. Congress) (2002), “Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002,” Public Law 107-204, 107th Congress.  
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Table 8: Audit Fees and Internal Control Weakness 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Dependent Variable lnAUDITFEE lnAUDITFEE 
Independent Variables:   
FRAUD 0.1392** 0.2231*** 
(t value) (2.18) (3.08) 
ERROR 0.0813** 0.0818* 
 (1.97) (1.67) 
lnSIZE 0.4790*** 0.4791*** 
 (170.77) (170.79) 
lnSEGMENT 0.1225*** 0.1225*** 
 (22.92) (22.93) 
FOREIGN -0.0245 -0.0245 
 (-0.23) (-0.23) 
INHERENT 0.6596*** 0.6603*** 
 (22.72) (22.74) 
QUICKRATIO -0.0193*** -0.0193*** 
 (-14.08) (-14.06) 
DEBT -0.0836*** -0.0839*** 
 (-3.53) (-3.55) 
ROA -0.1670*** -0.1672*** 
 (-9.61) (-9.62) 
LOSS 0.1511*** 0.1510*** 
 (15.33) (15.32) 
OPINION 0.1111*** 0.1112*** 
 (13.33) (13.34) 
BIG4 0.2957*** 0.2959*** 
 (28.71) (28.72) 
TENURE -0.0658*** -0.0658*** 
 (-4.14) (-4.14) 
WEAKIC 0.3229*** 0.3262*** 
 (22.26) (22.11) 
FRAUD×WEAKIC  -0.2874** 
  (-2.15) 
ERROR×WEAKIC  -0.0030 
  (-0.03) 
Constant 8.5443*** 8.5394*** 
 (17.40) (17.39) 
Year Controlled Yes Yes 
Industry Controlled Yes Yes 
Sample Size 20,773 20,773 
Adjusted R2 0.7706 0.7706 
       
This table provides regression results testing the association between audit fees and restatement due to fraud and 
errors during the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period (2003–2013) incorporating a “weak internal control (WEAKIC)” 
variable in the model. WEAKIC is measured as an indicator variable, which is equal to one if a firm has nonstandard 
report of internal control over financial reporting, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Appendix.  *, 
**, *** indicate statistical significance at ten percent, five percent, and one percent, respectively using two-sided t-
test. 
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Table 9: Audit Fees and Unexplained Fraud and Error: Two-Stage Regressions 
 
 1ST Stage Logit  2nd Stage OLS 
 Model (1) Model (2)  Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Dependent Variable FRAUD 
(p-value) 
ERROR 
(p-value) 
 lnAUDITFEE lnTOTALFEE lnNON-
AUDITFEE 
Independent Variables:       
Unexplained FRAUD    0.1392** 0.1856*** 0.2885 
(t value)    (2.28) (3.03) (1.38) 
Unexplained ERROR    0.0813** 0.0709* 0.2288 
    (1.97) (1.71) (1.62) 
lnSIZE -0.0430 -0.1331*  0.4622*** 0.4782*** 0.6121*** 
 (0.6965) (0.0716)  (69.72) (71.87) (27.04) 
lnSEGMENT 0.2043 0.0630  0.1560*** 0.1761*** 0.3178*** 
 (0.2956) (0.6429)  (11.37) (12.78) (6.78) 
FOREIGN -4.5130 -7.1546  -1.2344*** -1.4043*** -2.6808* 
 (0.9435) (0.9637)  (-2.98) (-3.38) (-1.90) 
INHERENT 2.0741** -0.7137  0.8902*** 0.9386*** 0.7448 
 (0.0333) (0.3195)  (6.68) (7.02) (1.64) 
QUICKRATIO -0.1598 0.0251  -0.0395*** -0.0471*** -0.0640* 
 (0.1437) (0.3909)  (-3.99) (-4.73) (-1.89) 
DEBT -1.0288 -0.0791  -0.2332*** -0.2664*** -0.4132* 
 (0.3013) (0.8937)  (-3.48) (-3.97) (-1.81) 
ROA 2.6655** 0.6434  0.2563 0.3574** 0.5297 
 (0.0282) (0.2233)  (1.55) (2.16) (0.94) 
LOSS 0.5258 -0.0606  0.2193*** 0.2304*** 0.1375 
 (0.1704) (0.8009)  (6.52) (6.82) (1.20) 
OPINION 1.2513*** 0.2410  0.3048*** 0.3592*** 0.5536** 
 (<0.0001) (0.2439)  (3.96) (4.65) (2.11) 
BIG4 1.2371** 0.4212  0.5022*** 0.5551*** 0.9171*** 
 (0.0169) (0.1081)  (6.47) (7.13) (3.46) 
TENURE 0.2298 -0.3148  -0.0594** -0.0650*** -0.5817*** 
 (0.6537) (0.4389)  (-2.38) (-2.60) (-6.84) 
WEAKIC 1.3435*** 1.6156***  0.6413*** 0.6735*** 0.7154** 
 (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (6.14) (6.42) (2.01) 
Constant -15.2740 -13.4159 
 
5.3276*** 5.2137*** 0.4508 
 (0.9565) (0.9699)  (4.52) (4.40) (0.11) 
Year Controlled Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Controlled Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 20,773 20,773  20,773 20,773 20,773 
Max Rescaled R2 0.2402 0.1887     
Likelihood Ratio 207.92*** 311.82***     
Adjusted R2    0.7706 0.7805 0.3769 
This table presents an alternative two-stage model to test the two hypotheses. In stage one, we use a logit model with 
FRAUD and ERROR as the dependent variables, WEAKIC, and all other control variables in Model (A). We obtain 
the error terms from the stage one logit model and use them to create two new variables: Unexplained FRAUD and 
Unexplained ERROR. In the stage two OLS model, these two new variables are designed to capture the unexplained 
portion of FRAUD and ERROR by other control variables. Other variables are defined in Appendix. Models (3), (4), 
and (5) report the results with dependent variables lnAUDITFEE, lnTOTALFEE, and lnNONAUDITFEE as the 
dependent variables, respectively.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at ten percent, five percent, and one 
percent, respectively using two-sided t-test. 
